Why did (pre‐industrial) firms train?: premiums and apprenticeship contracts in 18th century England by Minns, Chris & Wallis, Patrick
  
Working Papers No. 155/11 
 
 
 
 
 
Why did (pre‐industrial) firms train? Premiums and 
apprenticeship contracts in 18th century England 
 
 
 
 
 
Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
©  Chris Minns, Patrick Wallis 
October 2011 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Department of Economic History 
London School of Economics 
Houghton Street 
London, WC2A 2AE 
Tel:  +44 (0) 20 7955 7860 
Fax:  +44 (0) 20 7955 7730 
  
Why did (pre‐industrial) firms train? Premiums and apprenticeship 
contracts in 18th century England.
 
 
Chris Minns, Patrick Wallis* 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Despite poor information flows, high levels of uncertainty, and low completion rates, training 
through apprenticeship provided the main mechanism for occupational human capital formation in pre‐
industrial England. This paper demonstrates how training premiums complemented the formal legal 
framework surrounding apprenticeship to secure training contracts. Premiums compensated parties for 
the anticipated risk of default, but in most trades were small enough to allow access to apprenticeship 
training for youths from modest families.  
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Introduction  
The contribution of human capital to economic development is well established. Apprenticeship 
was the leading formal source of vocational skills in outside the agricultural sector in pre‐modern 
England ‐circa 1700, roughly nine per cent of the English adult male population had served an 
apprenticeship in London alone (Minns and Wallis, 2011). But why did masters train? As a system of on‐
the‐job training, apprenticeship involves skill transmission over an extended period. The long‐term 
contracting this requires presents a fundamental problem for all parties involved. Most explanations of 
apprenticeship’s success therefore centre on contract enforcement by formal institutions (van Zanden 
2009; Epstein 1998). Yet studies of attrition among pre‐industrial apprentices find high rates of 
departure by the middle of the contract, indicating that contract enforcement was weak in practice 
(Minns and Wallis 2011; Ben‐Amos 1994). This paper provides a new explanation for how sustainable 
long‐term contracts for human capital were written in a condition of high uncertainty.  
At first glance, apprenticeship in pre‐industrial England fits well with a stylised model of general 
human capital acquisition (Becker 1964): masters had ample opportunity to recover costs from trained 
apprentices over long indentures lasting seven years or more. However, in its pre-modern form, 
apprenticeship lacked many of the internal career incentives that generate commitment among its 
equivalents today. Indentures were private contracts between individuals – apprentices (and their 
families) and masters who were in effect proprietors of small enterprises. Apprenticeship rarely led to a 
career within a firm: successful apprentices became masters. The consequence was predictable: 
defaulting was widespread, despite the presence of formal institutions. Nonetheless, defaulting does 
not appear to have undermined the willingness of masters and apprentices to enter into lengthy 
apprenticeship contracts.  
In this paper, we explain how training could be contracted for in eighteenth century England. 
Using a new dataset of apprenticeship records, we provide the most comprehensive study to date of the 
economics of training in a pre‐industrial economy. Our analysis focuses on an arrangement that was 
common in apprenticeship agreements in the 18
th
 century, but has largely disappeared from training 
schemes since – the payment of a premium to masters when training began. Historians of pre‐industrial 
apprenticeship have argued that premiums were large and ubiquitous, limiting economic mobility 
through apprenticeship. We show instead that the financial barrier presented by premiums has been 
overstated, varied widely between occupations and individuals, and was in many cases dwarfed by the 
cost of starting a business following a successful apprenticeship. As we show, premiums were 
responsive to apprentices’ expected productivity, and the likely availability of economic rents following 
training. One of the main purposes of premiums was to solve the problem of potential holdups in the 
training market due to the high risk of default. Premiums allowed masters to accept apprentices readily 
and invest in training their apprentices despite high rates of attrition.  
Understanding how training was secured has implications for the ongoing debate regarding the 
role of formal institutions in generating economic growth. While England’s precocity in human capital 
formation has been identified as a key engine of early economic growth, the restrictive legal framework 
surrounding craft apprenticeship in pre‐industrial England gave masters and apprentices few degrees of 
freedom with which to form mutually agreeable contracts. Evidence of high rates of attrition suggests 
that some aspects of these contracts were in any case unenforceable. Premiums were a private‐order 
arrangement that allowed training to be adjusted to individual circumstances and secured training 
despite high levels of uncertainty, limited information flows, and the rigidities present in formal legal 
arrangements.  
 
Training contracts in pre‐Industrial England: theory and history  
The specification of apprenticeship contracts is problematic, with both parties struggling to commit to 
incomplete contracts over a long period (Grubb 1997; Humphries 2003). Masters may shirk on training 
or wages. Apprentices may quit prematurely once the wage they could obtain in the outside labour 
market exceeds that received from the master. We use a simple model of apprenticeship to illustrate the 
difficulties of securing training contracts in pre‐industrial England. Our baseline model features a 
competitive training market, where in equilibrium the price paid by apprentices to train is equal to the 
costs borne by masters who provide training. Apprentices who secure training receive a wage 
(subsistence payment) (w) in every training period, and may receive a post‐training benefit on 
completion (B). Masters receive the product of apprentice labour in each period (v), pay training costs (c) 
in the form of instruction or supervision, and may receive a training premium (P) from the apprentice. 
Our baseline model also includes the probability of apprentice attrition (). With r as the discount rate and 
T as the length of the indenture, Equation (1) illustrates equilibrium in present value terms
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Equation (1) suggests several ways in which contracts could be varied to account for the 
heterogeneity of masters and apprentices. As is sometimes observed in present‐day 
 
apprenticeship, 
training wages (w) can be varied to offset planned training inputs (c) and apprentices’ anticipated 
productivity (v). The length of the indenture term (T) can also be adjusted; several historical studies of 
indenture contracts find that productivity and length of term were inversely correlated.
2
 
Post training 
incentives (B) can be used to make contracts self‐enforcing. Today, this may include ongoing 
employment in the firm providing training.
3
 
Historically, part of the apprentice or servant’s 
compensation was sometimes received on completion (Hamilton 1995, Galenson 1981). Attrition () 
could be reduced by formal and informal contract enforcement mechanisms, such as social sanctions or 
the recapture and punishment of runaway apprentices.  
These explanations fail to offer a sufficient account for how apprenticeship contracts were 
secured in the institutional environment of pre‐industrial England. Apprentices and masters had little 
freedom to vary most elements of their contracts. Local and national laws fixed the main terms of 
apprenticeship across England until 1813. Nationwide, the minimum contract duration was seven years. 
The payment of money wages to apprentices was illegal in many places (including London), though 
some did receive payments or perquisites. Pre‐industrial England did offer distinctive post‐training 
incentives to apprentices that some have suggested made contracts self‐enforcing (Humphries 2003). 
Most importantly, completing an apprenticeship was a legal requirement before practicing a trade 
(Davies 1956). Apprenticeship also conferred local economic privileges through guild membership and 
                                                            
1 This model used is an extended version of that found in Hamilton (1995).  
2 See Kaplan (1993) and DeMunck (2007) for apprenticeships in Paris and Antwerp, Hamilton (1995) for Montreal 
apprentices, and Galenson (1981) for indentured servants bound for the Americas. 
3 Market imperfections may give training firms some monopsony power in setting wages for generally trained 
employees: see Acemoglu and Pischke (1998). 
citizenship in incorporated cities, and positive effects on reputation.
4
 Masters and apprentices who 
breached contracts could be pursued at law. However, the impact of these incentives is questionable, 
particularly for apprentices who did not envisage establishing an independent business. They left open 
several important outside options for ex‐apprentices, including agricultural and military employment, as 
well as work as journeymen.
5
 The best indicator of their (in)effectiveness is that completion rates were 
low in pre‐industrial England (Minns and Wallis 2011; Ben Amos 1991).  
High levels of attrition presented a serious challenge to training arrangements in preindustrial England. 
If the outlay of masters (w+c) was front‐loaded relative to the recovery of surplus from apprentices (v), 
masters risked being unable to recover their investment in apprentices if the complete indenture term 
was not served. Masters could alternatively contract on the anticipated term for a given rate of attrition. 
One way to compensate for early departure would be to lower the outlay on apprentices by reducing w 
or c. It is unclear how realistic it was for masters to do this. Lowering w below subsistence would affect 
productivity. Reducing c raised the risk of apprentice default.
6
 Alternatively, masters could only accept 
apprentices with a high initial v. The use of trial periods suggests that masters sought information about 
an apprentice’s productivity.
7
 
However, screening was costly in an early modern environment, and there 
is little evidence that training was constrained by masters being especially choosy about the quality of 
their apprentices. Another alternative would be to alter the sequence of training investments and wage 
payments (Wallis 2008). By placing a significant share of the outlays towards the end of the contract, 
masters would limit losses from apprentices who quit early, while providing an incentive for others to 
remain attached to the indenture. Altering the sequence of training investments would have 
implications for apprentice output over the term, and the skills acquired by apprentices who completed 
indentures as well as those that left early.  
While there is some evidence that masters pursued some of the solutions to apprentice attrition listed 
above, a fourth option appears prominent given what is known about contracting for pre‐industrial 
apprenticeship: the use of up‐front training premiums (P). Premiums allowed masters to charge 
apprentices in advance for the direct costs of training. As we will show, however, both the size of 
premiums and the frequency with which they were charged varied widely between and within guilds 
and occupations, and even among apprentices indentured to the same master. These variations suggest 
that premiums had an important role in dealing with the heterogeneity of apprentices and masters 
entering into training contracts. By acting as side payments that gave masters advance compensation 
for potential attrition, premiums made it feasible for apprentices to receive their desired c and w, despite 
modest initial productivity and the risk of attrition. This solution resolved the classic problem of credible 
commitment in firm‐provided general training without creating incentives for masters to further 
constrain training opportunities beyond those imposed by guilds.  
If premiums were fulfilling this function, they should reflect the anticipated probability of attrition 
in any particular contract. Some of the reasons for attrition, such as mortality, and master-apprentice 
match quality, were difficult to observe in advance. But attrition also depended on the intentions of 
masters and apprentices, which may have been partly predictable.  
The decision to enter or leave an apprenticeship would depend on the expected present value of 
future income during training and following completion (Yc) relative to the expected present value of 
                                                            
4 Humphries (2009) observes an effect of completion on income among early industrial apprentices. Rights to 
poor relief are sometimes cited, but in law serving 40 days of an apprenticeship conferred rights. 
5 Journeywork technically required a completed apprenticeship, but this was variably enforced in different trades. 
6 There is evidence that masters economised on training costs by providing little direct instruction (Wallis 2008). 
7 See Minns and Wallis (2011) for evidence on the presence of trials. 
income in alternative employment (Yo). Yc and Yo are functions of match quality (Mc and Mo), 
apprentice skill (v) and remuneration of skill in the local labour market, and the resources (R) that the 
apprentice brings to post‐training activity:  
Yc = f(Mc,v,R)   (2) 
Yo = f(Mo,v,R)   (3), 
dv
Yc  and 
dv
Yo  are the return to ‚skill‛ in both markets. Apprentices’ resources (R) include family 
specific attributes, such as financial and social capital, and potential inheritances. Social capital and 
family resources should affect both the inside and outside options, but high transportation costs and 
poor communications imply that these would matter more for Yo than for Yc, with 
dR
Yc
dR
Yo 
8 
The inclusion of R in equations (2) and (3) implies a significant deviation from simple, competitive labour 
markets. This appears plausible given post‐training opportunities in an economy without large firms. 
Establishing a business required significant capital unavailable to the credit‐constrained majority; many 
‚failed‛ apprentices returned to positions that made direct use of family resources in a similar manner.  
Accounting for the costs of exiting an apprenticeship (Cx), youths should leave indentures if  
Yo – Yc > Cx for the balance of the term. Initially, apprentices would have better information about Yo 
than Yc. As they learned more about Yc over their term, departure would become attractive for some 
apprentices with better outside options. Masters would know less about their apprentices’ outside 
option, but received some signal about R from the occupation or social origins of the apprentices’ father 
and their location. All else being equal, masters would anticipate a higher probability of departure for 
apprentices with better relative outside options (Yo‐Yc) at the outset, and charge higher premiums as a 
consequence.
9
 
The identification of productive attributes more valuable in outside activities than in 
apprenticeship would have a similar effect.
10
 
Risk adverse masters should also condition premiums on 
uncertainty surrounding apprentices’ productivity. This would imply masters charging higher premiums 
when it was more costly to collect information about v, R, and Mc  
Following equation (1), premiums should also have been responsive to signals about the 
productivity of apprentices, their expectations about treatment while contracted, the quality of training 
likely to be provided by masters, and any end payment, whether financial or in the form of long‐run 
economic rents. This interpretation is supported by most theories of premium payment and premium 
size put forward by historians, which generally link premiums to the net costs or returns from training.
11
 
One further argument in the literature is that premiums produced self‐enforcing contracts by 
operating as bonds that raised the cost of default (Epstein 1998; De Munck 2007). This would imply that 
significant P on the right‐hand side of equation (1) was matched by a similar B on the left‐hand side. This 
                                                            
8 See Minns and Wallis (2011) for evidence on this point. 
9 Apprentices from poor families suggest ambiguous predictions. At face value, they have fewer outside options, 
but conversely, the lack of family capital may have reduced the benefit of completed apprenticeship by reducing 
the likelihood of establishing an independent business. 
10 Differences in departure costs (Cx) should also matter for this assessment. We do not have firm evidence on this, 
but expect that the costs of running away may have been lower for migrant apprentices, who could find family 
members to take them on outside of their training location. 
11 In returns, a number of accounts include prestige and economic rents from guild or city privileges, as well as 
greater productivity. On profit, see Earle (1989). On prestige, see Kaplan (1993, p. 449); Brooks (1994); De Munck 
(2007, p.42).Reith (2007, p. 183) suggests fees were only charged for weaker youths by Augsburg bakers. De 
Munck (2007) claims that fees reflect teaching costs.  
does not fit with recent evidence showing that premiums were partially returned when contracts ended 
prematurely ‐even when the apprentice was at fault (Wallis 2011) – but were not usually reimbursed 
upon completion.
12
 
As we will show below, many apprentices paid no premium (Table 2), and it is not 
obvious why a standard bond against default would not be used if required, as they were often given to 
guarantee masters’ against losses through fraud (Earle 1989).  
Two final issues need to be addressed. First, is the competitive training market described in 
equation (1) a useful portrayal of pre‐industrial reality? Guilds generally restricted the number of 
apprentices their members could train, often to one or two at a time. This ‚soft cap‛ on availability 
would sustain high premiums when demand for training was high. Guild members were not the only 
suppliers of training, however. No restrictions applied outside guild towns, and even in guild towns, by 
the eighteenth century apprenticeships were increasingly offered by people outside guilds. Nonetheless, 
masters in trades where guild constraints were effective could potentially use premiums to capture 
economic rents, while their apprentices might expect to gain access to some of these rents after 
training.  
Second, using premiums to secure apprenticeship contracts under high attrition has a large 
potential impact on training and economic mobility. The typical English family had little ability to save, 
and access to long‐term, unsecured credit was extremely limited in pre‐industrial England (Muldrew 
1998). Many would struggle to raise the funds to pay a training premium. Premium size thus presents 
itself as an important variable for the wider economic performance of the economy – it could present a 
significant barrier to training, with implications for productivity, economic mobility and the extent to 
which aptitude and opportunity were matched (Ben‐Amos 1994; Brooks 1994; de Munck, 2007. See 
also: Ogilvie 1997; Ogilvie 2004).  
 
New evidence on apprenticeship: premiums and indentures  
Our evidence derives from two sources recording the indenture characteristics of large numbers of 
apprentices, masters and the premiums paid. The first details 300,000 apprenticeships on which masters 
paid Stamp Tax. From 1710 to 1804, apprenticeship premiums were taxed at 2.5 per cent on fees up to 
£50, and 5 per cent over £50.
13
  
The Commissioners of Stamps recorded the payments, noting the 
name, address, and trade of masters, the name and sometimes the family background of the 
apprentice, and the date of indenture.
14
 
We have digitised a typescript abstract of the registers from 
1710 and 1774. For over 30,000 apprentices information on all characteristics survives.
15
 
We then linked 
a sub‐sample of apprentices to baptismal records in the International Genealogical Index (IGI), for which 
we calculate their age when apprenticed.
16
 
The Stamp Tax data does have flaws. The records are 
affected by lags in registration and occasional losses where provincial records were not properly 
registered: for a few years almost no premiums are recorded. Under‐counting and under‐reporting of 
premiums may have occurred as Masters’ sought to minimize tax liabilities. Perhaps the most important 
shortcoming is that they omit apprentices who paid no premium.  
                                                            
12 Apprentices sometimes received a modest exit payment, but these were small relative to premiums and 
became rarer over time (Grubb 1997). Unfortunately our source material provides no evidence on completion 
payments.  
13 
 
After 1804 this tax structure was replaced by a simpler banded tax.  
14 
 
The records of the Commissioners of Stamps continue record late payment of premiums until 1811.  
15 Information on apprentices’ father’s occupation and place were only recorded intermittently.  
16 The linkage is discussed in Wallis, Webb, and Minns (2010).  
The second series consists of apprenticeship contracts registered by seven London livery 
companies. After the introduction of the Stamp Tax, some guilds began to record premiums alongside 
the information they gathered about apprenticeships. These records offer several advantages. Masters 
had little incentive to under‐report premiums, as guild records were not used by authorities involved in 
tax collection. Guild registration was probably more accurate that stamp duty registers; guilds possessed 
local monitoring systems, and the system had been in place for several centuries. A crucial aspect for our 
analysis is that guilds noted when no premium was paid. Guild data, however, is often unclear about 
masters’ occupations. Although many no longer followed the guild’s nominal trade, precise occupations 
are rarely recorded. Our data covers only a minority of guilds, and many apprentices were trained (and 
paid premiums) outside of the guild system in this period.  
 
Premiums and access to apprenticeship  
The Stamp Tax data suggest stable flows into apprenticeship between the 1710s and the 1770s.  
(Figure 1). The annual fluctuations apparent in the second quarter of the century mainly reflect record 
survival. We find no sign of the reported decline in apprenticeship during the eighteenth century, 
despite falls in the numbers of apprentices registered by guilds (Minns and Wallis 2009; Snell 1996; 
Walker 1986).
17
 
Premiums rose gradually in London until the 1740s; outside of London payments were 
much lower (Figure 2).
18
  
Much of the difference between London and the provinces was due to the 
concentration of prosperous trades that charged high premiums within the metropolis.
19
 
 
Historians have suggested that premiums were large and ubiquitous. For apprentice merchants, 
Grassby suggests large sums of about £100 in 1700 and £200 to £300 in the early 19
th
 
 
century were 
usual (Grassby 1995, pp. 67‐9). In trades, Brooks suggests premiums of £20 to £30 were common 
(Brooks 1994). Such figures are often based on fragmentary data, often from London (for example, 
Earle 1989, p.84).
20
 We find that premiums were generally more modest. In most crafts and trades, 
including clothing, footwear, textiles, and metal manufacturing, fees below ten pounds were typical 
(Table 1). Professionals typically charged around 50 pounds, and there was more heterogeneity in prices 
for these occupations. Despite large difference in mean premiums between occupations, the 
distribution for specific occupations overlapped substantially (Figure 3). London guild records match the 
Stamp Tax data (Table 2). While some aspirant merchants or professionals paid large sums, they made 
up a small minority of apprentices. Nationwide, only 8 per cent of apprenticeships cost over 50 pounds, 
and 5 per cent exceeded 100 pounds; even in London, the figures were only 17 per cent and 8 per cent.  
London guilds also recorded when no premium was paid. In relatively low prestige guilds 
(Blacksmiths, Plasterers, Vintners) only a minority paid premiums. The companies which noted the 
master’s occupation mainly contained prosperous trades, but even here we see large differences: the 
majority of plasterers’ apprentices paid nothing, as did a quarter of druggists and grocers.
21
 
All 
bookbinders, booksellers, printers, and stationers in the sample were charged premiums. Some of those 
                                                            
17 The rate of entry into apprenticeship also appears fairly constant over the period (Minns and Wallis, 2009)  
18 Figure 2 presents nominal apprenticeship premiums. Adjusting for the trend in consumer prices (Allen, 2001) 
implies a gentle rise in real terms.  
19 Average premiums in the city of London were about 35 percent greater than in the largest 11 provincial towns 
in England (DeVries 1984).  
20 Van der Beek (2010) offers more comprehensive evidence of premium size from a sample of Stamp Tax 
premium payments.  
21 
 
London companies incorporated a range of different occupations. For several companies, the occupation is 
recorded in the eighteenth century, allowing us to focus our evidence.  
escaping premiums were masters’ sons, or local associates. The probability of paying a premium was 
higher in occupations where premiums were larger.  
Were premiums a barrier to entry? While premiums were smaller than the literature suggests for 
those that did pay, they were not trivial sums. Unskilled workers in the building sector in provincial 
England earned roughly £12 a year. Families would require several months’ income to pay £5 to £10 for 
an apprenticeship with a mason or weaver.
22
 
The larger premiums paid to access some occupations 
equalled several years’ income. For youths without family backing, raising a premium would have been 
an onerous task. It would take roughly 2 years of agricultural service to raise the funds to pay a premium 
of £5.
23
  
Compared to alternative human capital investments, premiums were expensive. Schooling a 
child, for example, cost around one pound per annum.
24
  
There is little evidence that families used credit 
to pay premiums. In the 18
th
 
  
century, the English credit market supplied short term credits or secured 
loans, not the unsecured long‐term loans required for training (Muldrew 1998).  
Premiums did create a threshold that poor families struggled to cross. Near the bottom of the income 
distribution, labourers made up around 24% of workers in this period (Shaw‐Taylor, 2010), but supplied 
just 4% of those apprentices who paid premiums. Mercantile masters recruited primarily from the top of 
society, and the majority of apprentices in the professions were sons of professionals or gentlemen 
(Table 6). However, boys from poorer families in agriculture and manufacturing could enter those crafts 
where premiums were smaller or less frequent. In clothing and footwear, about ten per cent of 
apprentices were labourers’ sons. Moreover, premiums were often only a small part of the investment 
required to develop a career as an independent craft worker. The opportunity costs associated with 
foregone income dominated premiums for most would‐be craft apprentices.25
 
Opportunity costs do not 
require up‐front financing as did premiums, but poorer families may have struggled to subsist without 
access to the income of teenage boys. A cost that often dwarfed premiums was that of the capital 
required to set up an independent business after training was completed. In prosperous trades, this cost 
was perhaps ten or twenty times that of the premium levied (Campbell 1747, pp. 331‐340).  
 
Premiums and indenture characteristics  
We use OLS regression analysis to test our predictions on the roles of premiums in the indenture 
contract. For the nationwide Stamp Tax data, regressions are used to estimate the determinants of (log) 
premium size (Table 3). All specifications include a full set of guild, occupation and year dummies. 
Because only positive premiums were recorded, selection into the population is an issue, but we have 
little capacity to deal with this in a formal manner. We estimated a similar series of regressions for 
                                                            
22 Provincial wages are the average for building labourers, 1710‐1772 (Clark, 2005). Days worked are from Voth 
(2001), p. 1076 (1750 estimate).  
23 Kussmaul (1981): 38. Average wage for servant in husbandry under 15 was £2 10s, rising to £5 15s at 20.  
24 
 
At a fee of 6d per week, and 45 weeks teaching a year, school would cost £1 2s 6d per annum. Humphries 
finds an average of three to four years of schooling among eighteenth century autobiographies: Humphries 2009: 
314.  
25 Assuming that youths would earn a rising fraction of adult income with age (20% at age 14, 40% at age 15, 
60% at age 16, 70% at age 17, 80% at age 18, 90% at age 19, and 20% at age 20 – see Van Zanden 2009. p. 
160), a provincial adult unskilled wage of 1s per day, that youths works 228 days per year (Voth 2001), and a 
discount rate of 7.5 per cent, the present value of lost earnings during an apprenticeship, relative to a subsistence 
income of £5 per annum, was about 26 pounds.  
premium size for the smaller London guild sample (Table 5, column 3 and 4).
26
 These models have 
limited information on the master’s occupation, although we do use detailed occupations for a sub‐
sample for which these were recorded (column 5). This sample allows us to discern between apprentices 
who paid premiums and those who did not. In addition to OLS regressions of premium size, we use a 
linear probability model to explain the presence of a premium (Table 4, column 1 and 2).
27
 
The regressions offer support for the key hypothesis that premiums offered compensation for 
limited information and higher risks. Distance offers one proxy for information: masters were likely to 
know less about migrant apprentices. We find that in the London guild sample, ‘remote’ apprentices 
(from a county not bordering London or Middlesex) paid significantly higher premiums.
28
  
In the Stamp 
Tax sample, apprentices who moved county to train paid just over eight per cent more.
29
 The London 
sample shows no apparent difference between remote and local apprentices in the likelihood that a 
premium was levied (Table 4 column 1): better information might produce discounts, but not waivers. 
Family connections, which carried information but also social obligations, had the biggest impact on the 
likelihood of avoiding a premium. As this underlines, information is often embedded in social networks 
that can themselves reduce risk or produce alternative reasons for discounts through mutual 
obligations. The loss of networks can be costly: apprentices whose father was dead were somewhat 
more likely to pay, and to pay more (Table 4).  
Masters lacked reliable information about apprentices’ probable commitment to their contract. In other 
work, we find that boys from wealthy and professional backgrounds who were apprenticed in London 
were significantly more likely to quit prematurely, perhaps to exploit their families’ connections 
elsewhere; poor migrants, with fewer outside options, generally stayed (Minns and Wallis 2011). Here, 
when we include interaction terms between ‘remoteness’ and parental occupation (Table 3, columns 1‐
3, Table 4, column 4), we find the interactions are positive, significant, and large for migrant sons of 
most backgrounds. Premiums were largest for those likely to have the best outside options: the sons of 
gentlemen, traders or professionals. Conversely, migrant apprentices from low‐status backgrounds paid 
less than locals. Apprentices appear to have paid extra to compensate masters for the increased 
probability of early departure: for gentlemen’s sons, premiums were as much as 20 per cent higher.  
A further test for the argument that these interactions reflected anticipated risk of departure is 
provided by comparing trades with differing levels of prosperity. The impact of premature departure 
would depend on the compensation bundle the apprentice offered to the master. Large premiums, as 
demanded by merchants and professionals, reduced the relative importance of the apprentices’ labour. 
Where apprentices’ paid low premiums, their labour was a larger share of masters’ compensation, and 
masters were more likely to end up out of pocket if an apprentice left early or was unproductive. In a 
further set of regressions, we distinguish two broad groups of occupations in the Stamp Tax data and 
                                                            
26 The censored nature of the data is an important issue in estimating regressions of premium size. Various 
econometric solutions have been proposed to deal with this type of censoring. In the specification used in column 
1, we adopt the crude approach of using a left hand side variable equal to ln(premium + £1). Tobit regressions that 
formally account for the censoring (not reported here) give marginal effects that are similar to the findings in 
Column 2 of Table 3.  
27 We have also used a probit estimator for this regression (results not reported), giving marginal effects that are 
extremely close to those reported here.  
28 We also estimated this model with a ‚neighbouring counties‛ variable for counties bordering London or 
Middlesex (Berkshire, Buckinghamshire, Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent, and Surrey), with similar results.  
29 This result comes from a regression without the full set of father occupation and different county interaction 
terms. We have not included this specification in Table 4 to conserve space, but results are available on request.  
 
compare the sensitivity of premium size to apprentice characteristics in each (Table 5). In low‐premium 
occupations (textiles, footwear, and clothing trades), premiums were highly responsive to the 
interactions of family background and migration discussed above: masters charged much higher 
premiums for those with a high probability of early departure. In more prosperous trades, by contrast, 
these interactions had smaller and generally insignificant coefficients, as we would expect.  
Limited information about contractual risks affected apprentices as well as masters. The results 
show that apprentices valued demonstrable training quality. The Stamp Tax allows us to reconstruct the 
training and premium histories of around 9,000 masters by linking masters’ names, places and 
occupations. We then computing their total number of apprentices and average premium, and 
identified each apprentice’s position in their master’s training history. Adding this information to the 
regression models suggests little relationship between the total number of apprentices taken by a 
master and their premiums. However, masters’ experience of training did matter. Masters were able to 
charge higher premiums with each apprentice they took, with the fourth apprentice paying over 20 per 
cent more than the first (Table 3, column 3).
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We can extend this approach to get some sense of the effect of other, unobservable 
characteristics of masters. We include the log of the average premium each master charged, for masters 
who trained at least two identifiable apprentices (Table 4, column 4). Unsurprisingly, an apprentice’s 
premium is highly correlated to that paid by other apprentices to the same master. This is perhaps the 
clearest indication of how master‐specific attributes determined premiums even within well‐defined 
occupations. In this model, apprentice characteristics and master experience still affect premiums, with 
positive and significant coefficients on the usual parental background and apprentice rank variables. 
That premiums varied with these characteristics among apprentices with the same master offers 
compelling evidence that the apprenticeship market was highly responsive to differences in information, 
expectation and experience.  
The regressions also show how premiums were used to respond to the heterogeneity of 
apprentices and masters in terms of differences in anticipated productivity (v), subsistence expectations 
(w), and institutional rents (B). The analysis establishes a clear link between productivity and premiums. 
Apprentices with relevant prior experience through exposure to the occupation received a discount: 
those whose fathers’ occupations matched their master’s paid premiums that were 9 per cent lower 
(Table 3). Age offers a more surprising result. As physical maturity would affect apprentices’ 
productivity, one would expect younger apprentices to pay more. Instead, premiums peaked around the 
age of 17 (Table 3, column 4), even in craft occupations, before falling for the small group of older 
apprentices who likely had prior skills.
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Very young apprentices may have been serving longer terms.
32
 
It 
is possible that the rising age‐premium profile reflects the increased risk of attrition among older 
apprentices who were more likely to succumb to the temptations of marriage and wage labour.  
The results also show that, even within occupations, premiums reflected apprentices’ 
backgrounds (Tables 3 and 4). The relationship between parental occupation and premium appears 
broadly similar in both samples. Premiums were larger, and more common, for the children of more 
prosperous fathers, such as gentlemen, professionals and those in commerce and trade, while the 
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Unfortunately we do not know how successful previous indentures may have been. The measure of number 
of apprentices and their rank that we use will suffer from downward bias, as we miss any apprentices for whom no 
premium was paid or recorded.  
31 If we estimate this regression for the construction sector alone, premiums peak at age 18, controlling for all 
other characteristics.  
32 See Reith (2007), and De Munck (2007). Galenson (1982) finds that younger indentured servants had longer 
terms, all else equal.  
children of primary‐sector fathers, husbandmen and labourers paid less. For London, this was not driven 
by occupational variation within guilds: when we use master’s occupation (Table 5, column 5), parental 
background variables remain large and statistically significant.
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Due to the large numbers of buyers and 
sellers in the British market for training it seems unlikely that masters were able to price discriminate and 
charge the wealthy more. More plausible is that wealthier families paid more for better conditions: they 
supplied a larger P so their children enjoyed a greater w while indentured. This explanation had 
prominent advocates in the period: Daniel Defoe (1752, p. 12, p. 148) thought that high premiums 
were because parents’ ‘unreasonable fondness and partiality’ for their children led them to save them 
from menial work.  
As we suggested earlier, formal institutions did not secure apprenticeship contracts. However, 
many apprenticeships who completed terms would expect to capture institutional rents. Elsewhere we 
have shown that the tranche of apprentices who did complete contracts sought to comply with formal 
regulations, even if this meant returning to their master after an absence (Minns and Wallis 2011). Here, 
the regressions indicate a substantial price differences between masters who were citizens of London 
(and therefore guild members) and those who were not. Apprentices paid over fifteen per cent more to 
train with a citizen (Table 3 column 5, London apprentices only). If we compare masters with specified 
occupations in the guild sample to London masters who were not citizens in the Stamp Tax data we find 
that among grocers, booksellers, stationers and printers, citizens received significantly larger premiums: 
a 118% difference for grocers (£119 versus £45), 59% for booksellers (£74 versus £46), 70% for 
stationers (£56 versus £33), and 20% for printers (£21 versus £17.5). For plasterers, however, the 
premium was virtually identical: 6.8 pounds with a citizen and 7.0 with a non‐citizen.34
  
The variation 
between occupations above fits well with the historiography of these different trades. Guild 
membership as a plasterer meant little, with any guild rents permanently diminished following the 
sector’s de‐regulation to encourage rebuilding after the Great Fire of 1666. The Grocers’ Company 
showed little interest in defending monopolies in this period, but it did possess prestige and the 
possibility of useful networks. The Stationers’ Company was an unusually strong and homogenous 
guild, and asserted its authority over the printing and book trades throughout this period. This pattern 
confirms that apprentices training in guilds with significant market power were willing to pay larger 
premiums in anticipation of post‐completion rents and further economic privilege.  
 
Conclusion  
Apprenticeship was the main source of general and specific training in pre‐industrial England. 
The scale and continuity of the practice suggest that it was a success, despite small firm size, limited 
information flows about prospective training partners, and low completion rates. Masters and 
apprentices were heterogeneous, but England’s rigid labour laws gave them little room to acknowledge 
this through their contracts. Our analysis shows that training premiums were used to address the core 
tensions in securing pre‐industrial training contracts. Premiums compensated apprentices and masters 
for anticipated risks of default and limited information about training quality, supplying a crucial degree 
of freedom that allowed masters and apprentices to reach long‐term indenture agreements. Premiums 
                                                            
33 The coefficients on gentleman, distribution/sales, and professional father are larger in this sub‐sample (column 
5) than in the broader sample (columns 3 and 4), with or without controls for master occupation.  
34 
 
For London citizens, company not occupation was recorded. Thus, here we compare those company records 
that separately record occupation to non‐citizens in the Stamp Tax for whom only an occupation is available.  
 
also reflected occupational returns and residual corporate privileges. A consequence of this practice was 
an increase in the price of entrance into apprenticeship. This had consequences for access to training 
among the credit constrained, but premiums were typically small relative to opportunity costs and the 
capital required for a business. Apprenticeship premiums were not ubiquitous, and even in occupations 
where they were charged more frequently they were modest relative to expected incomes.  
Premiums do not represent the only potential solution to the hold‐up problem in a preindustrial training 
market. For example, labour laws could have been altered to allow shorter, more flexible terms of 
indenture, as in other markets for bound labour in the period. Changes to existing labour law faced 
strong opposition (Rule 1981; Berlin 2008), and neither the state, which taxed premiums, nor masters 
who received them had strong incentives to change the system. While many economic historians have 
argued that English pre‐industrial institutions were the foundation stone upon which modern economic 
growth was built, it is striking that a private‐order, informal mechanism was a necessary complement to 
formal rules in the crucial area of human capital formation.  
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Table 1: Apprenticeship premiums, selected occupations 1710-1773 
 Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation  
N  
Food industries  10.0  9  13.5  21627  
Clothing  11.5  7  18.1  32560  
Footwear  6.5  5  8.4  27436  
Textiles  15.7  5  35.7  19863  
Wood industries  15.6  10.5  17.5  13504  
Iron and steel manufacture  9.4  5  19.4  11649  
Building and construction  10.9  10  12.5  34684  
Other services  16.1  10  33.0  8655  
Professions  73.6  52.5  60.6  16767  
Notes: Stamp Tax sample. Occupation groups using Wrigley’s P.S.T codes to the second digit 
 
  
Table 2: London training premiums, companies, and selected occupations 
 
 
% paying 
premium  
average  sd  median  P10  P90  N  Insured 
wealth 
(med.)  
  Companies      
Apothecaries  84  73  36  63  40  105  589   
Blacksmiths  20  10  10  6  4  20  2105   
Grocers  59  84  80  30  8  200  380   
Plasterers  31  8  4  5  4  13  400   
Stationers  100  32  44  15  5  92  330   
Turners  54  12  12  10  4  21  401   
Vintners  32  16  22  10  5  21  823   
All companies  43  36  46  15  5  100  5028   
         
  Occupations      
Bookbinder  100  9  5  6  5  20  58   
Bookseller  100  74  56  63  5  150  42  800  
Druggist  73  175  46  200  105  210  15   
Grocer  78  119  78  100  50  200  32  500  
Haberdasher  95  67  71  40  5  150  20  500  
Instrument 
maker  
94  9  7  6.3  3  20  31   
Plasterer  42  7  4  6  4  13  85   
Printer  100  20  17  20  5  40  107  400  
Stationer  100  56  60  37  5  105  46  500  
Notes: Sample of seven London companies; see text for more sample details. N is the total number of 
observations, not the number of observations for which we have reported premiums. Median insured 
wealth is from Schwarz (1992) 
  
Table 3: Apprenticeship Premium determinants, Stamp Tax 
 
 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Gentleman father  .65 (.02)***  .65 (.02)***  .279 (.04)***  .61 (.06)***  .61 (.03)***  
Professional father  .47 (.03)***  .47 (.03)***  .23 (.05)***  .54 (.07)***  .45 (.05)***  
Primary father  ‐.04 (.02)**  ‐.04 (.02)**  ‐.01 (.04)  ‐.05 (.05)***  ‐.14 (.04)***  
Distribution/Sales father  .44 (.02)***  .44 (.02)***  .21 (.03)***  .34 (.04)***  .45 (.02)***  
Service father  ‐.01 (.02)  ‐.01 (.02)  ‐.07 (.04)*  .01 (.05)  ‐.09 (.03)***  
Labourer father 
 ‐.33 
(.03)***  
‐.33 (.03)***  ‐.16 (.09)*  ‐.22 (.09)**  ‐.56 (.07)***  
Father and Master in same occupation 
 ‐.09 
(.02)***  
‐.09 (.02)***  ‐.06 (.04)  ‐.08 (.05)*  ‐.06 (.03)**  
Remote*Gentleman father  .20 (.02)***  .19 (.02)***  .12 (.04)**  .18 (.08)**  .26 (.03)***  
Remote*Professional father  .10 (.04)***  .09 (.04)**  .01 (.08)  .03 (.11)  .12 (.06)**  
Remote*Primary father  .07 (.02)***  .07 (.02)***  .01 (.05)  ‐.18 (.07)**  .14 (.05)***  
Remote*Dist./sales father  .10 (.03)***  .09 (.03)***  .03 (.06)  .08 (.08)  .08 (.04)*  
Remote*Service father  .07 (.03)**  .07 (.03)**  .10 (.06)  ‐.03 (.09)  .10 (.04)**  
Remote*Labourer father  ‐.09 (.06)  ‐.09 (.06)  ‐.28 (.18)  ‐.24 (.17)*  .02 (.10)  
Remote*Craft father  .04 (.02)**  .04 (.02)**  ‐.02 (.04)  .01 (.05)  ‐.02 (.02)  
# of apprentices ever taken by master   .01 (.01)  ‐.02 (.01)***    
Second apprentice   .12 (.02)***  .13 (.02)***    
Third apprentice   .18 (.03)***  .17 (.03)***    
Fourth apprentice   .21 (.05)***  .19 (.05)***    
Fifth or higher apprentice   .06 (.07)  .26 (.06)***    
Ln(av.premium, other indentures)    .64 (.01)***    
Age 13‐15     .18 (.05)***   
Age 16‐18     .36 (.06)***   
Age 19‐30     .18 (.06)***   
Master citizen      .16 (.02)***  
Constant  1.9 (1.2)  1.9 (1.2)  .35 (.93)  2.1 (0.9)**  .96 (1.2)  
Year Dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
County Dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  N  
Occupation Dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
R‐square  .53  .53  .69  .51  .42  
N  32575  32575  4545  4752  16091  
      
Notes: Occupation dummies are defined using Wrigley’s PST codes to the third digit. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked *, **, and *** are significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
level. 
  
Table 4: The determinants of London training premiums, 1710-1800 
 
 
Premium paid (LPM)  Ln premium size (OLS)  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  
Remote apprentice  .00 (.01)   .10 (.04)***   .05 (.11)  
Father citizen  ‐.03 (.02)*  ‐.03 (.02)  ‐.09 (.05)*  ‐.07 (.05)  ‐.33 (.14)  
Father deceased  .04 (.01)***  .04 (.01)***  .05 (.03)  .06 (.03)*  .07 (.09)  
Kin apprentice  ‐.24 (.03)***  ‐.24 (.03)***  ‐.71 (.10)***  ‐.70 (.10)***  ‐ ‐  
Gentleman father  .23 (.02)***  .21 (.02)***  .94 (.06)***  .89 (.07)***  .99 (.17)***  
Professional father  .06 (.02)***  ‐.01 (.03)  .43 (.06)***  .15 (.08)**  .82 (.17)***  
Primary father  .04 (.02)**  .04 (.02)*  .08 (.05)  .01 (.09)  .03 (.14)  
Distribution/sales father  .09 (.02)***  .05 (.02)***  .35 (.05)***  .23 (.06)***  ‐.05 (.13)**  
Service father  .09 (.02)***  .08 (.02)***  .14 (.05)***  .15 (.05)***  ‐.03 (.16)  
Labourer father  ‐.01 (.02)  .00 (.03)  ‐.11 (.07)*  ‐.11 (.08)  ‐.13 (.20)  
Remote*Gentleman   .03 (.04)   .18 (.10)*   
Remote*Professional   .18 (.04)***   .76 (.12)***   
Remote*Primary   ‐.03 (.03)   .01 (.09)   
Remote* Dist./sales   .15 (.04)***   .63 (.12)***   
Remote*Service   .01 (.04)   ‐.20 (.13)   
Remote*Labourer   ‐.07 (.05)   ‐.08 (.15)   
Remote*Craft   ‐.06 (.02)***   ‐.06 (.06)   
Bookbinder      ‐.35 (.28)  
Bookseller      1.1 (.30)***  
Druggist      .99 (.43)**  
Grocer      1.4 (.27)***  
Haberdasher      .82 (.37)**  
Instruments      ‐.25 (.31)  
Plasterer      .26 (.16)  
Printer      .18 (.25)  
Stationer      .74 (.30)  
Company Dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Year Dummies  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y  
Constant  .55 (.12)***  .57 (.12)***  2.7 (.35)***  2.7 (.35)***  1.3 (.95)  
R‐square  .26  .26  .38  .39  .49  
N  7575  7575  7575  7575  1006  
Notes: Log premium is equal to In(Premium +£1), as described in the text. Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. Father craft worker is the excluded 
parent occupation group. All other occupations are the excluded master occupation group. 
  
Table 5: Apprenticeship Premium determinants, Stamp Tax, selected 
occupations 
 
 
(1) professions  (2) clothing, textiles, 
footwear  
Gentleman father  .59 (.06)***  .89 (.05)***  
Professional father  .36 (.07)***  .71 (.07)***  
Primary father  .06 (.10)  ‐.05 (.03)*  
Distribution/Sales father  .51 (.08)***  .85 (.06)***  
Service father  .09 (.10)  ‐.02 (.05)  
Labourer father  ‐1.8 (.35)***  ‐.24 (.04)***  
Father and Master in same occupation  ‐.21 (.12)*  ‐.07 (.04)  
Different county*Gentleman father  ‐.09 (.11)  .39 (.08)***  
Different county*Professional father  ‐.06 (.12)  .20 (.12)*  
Different county*Primary father  .04 (.16)  .09 (.06)  
Different county*Dist./Sales father  ‐.06 (.12)  .34 (.12)***  
Different county*Service father  .07 (.20)  .14( .10)  
Different county*Labourer father  3.4 (.84)***  ‐.29(.09)***  
Different county*Craft father  .13 (.10)  ‐.04 (.04)  
# of apprentices ever taken by master  .07 (.02)***  .06 (.02)***  
Second apprentice  .03 (.06)  .08 (.04)*  
Third apprentice  ‐.02 (.11)  .17 (.10)*  
Fourth apprentice  ‐.07 (.19)  .38 (.17)**  
Fifth or higher apprentice  .05 (.02)  ‐.28 (.24)  
Constant  4.9 (1.1) ***  2.8 (.99)***  
Year Dummies  Y  Y  
County Dummies  Y  Y  
Occupation Dummies  N  N  
R‐square  .27  .32  
N  2248  7170  
Notes: Occupation dummies are defined using Wrigley’s P.S.T codes to the third digit. Standard errors in 
parentheses. Coefficients marked *, **, and *** are significant at the 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent 
level. 
  
Table 6: Parental background of apprentices in selected occupations, 
1710-1772 
 
 
Clothing  Footwear  Textiles  Other 
Services  
Professions  
Median premium  7  5  5  10  52.5  
 % father occupation group    
Primary  25.2  31.5  22.9  17.0  76.0  
Manufacturing  40.1  42.1  42.6  38.0  15.7  
Distribution  3.2  1.5  4.6  4.7  7.8  
Sales  3.5  2.3  5.4  5.7  4.6  
Labourer  10.7  9.9  4.6  1.7  0.3  
No occupation  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  
Service  5.4  10.0  4.7  14.3  5.4  
Professional  3.6  1.2  4.2  6.0  18  
Gentleman  8.2  1.6  10.6  12.5  41.4  
N  3295  2235  2569  1845  2438  
Notes: Stamp Tax sample; see text for further details. 
  
Figure 1: Stamp Tax Indentures, 1710-1773 
 
 
Notes: Stamp tax sample; see text for further details 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2: Apprenticeship Premiums, 1710-1773 
 
 
Notes: Stamp tax sample; see text for further details 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Premium Distributions, Selected Occupations 
 
 
Notes: Distributions are kernel density estimates. The Epanechikov kernel is used, with a bandwidth of 3. 
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